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In the years since deciding District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) and
McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010), the Supreme Court has largely abandoned
the role of protecting American gun owners despite the text, history, and
tradition of the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms. The Supreme
Court has failed to use the jurisprudential tools at its disposal to ensure that the
fundamental right to arms is protected as robustly as other enumerated
constitutional rights. This failure is an acute one. And it is unjustifiable across
a wide variety of jurisprudential methodologies, from originalism to the nonoriginalist approaches that were dominant during the era of the Warren and
Burger Courts. The Supreme Court must do more to protect this right. With the
elevation of Judge Amy Coney Barrett to Justice Amy Coney Barrett, the
prospect of more robust judicial protection of Second Amendment rights has
increased.
There are two important lines of American jurisprudence that, while
historically influential, are not receiving their due in contemporary debates about
the scope and enforcement of the Second Amendment. The first line of
precedent stems from Footnote Four of the Supreme Court’s 1938 decision in
United States v. Carolene Products Co. 1 The second line of authority, also
outlined in Footnote Four, arises from the Supreme Court’s traditional role of
enforcing nationally accepted norms against outlier local majorities that are
oppressing distinct and insular minorities. 2 Today, certain outlier jurisdictions
dominated by large urban majorities are depriving gun owners, who are a distinct
and disfavored minority in many of those jurisdictions, of Second Amendment
rights that are fully recognized in the vast majority of states and localities. This
article discusses both lines of precedential authority. Today’s Supreme Court
can and should deploy these two principles to vindicate Second Amendment
rights from continued attacks, and to roll back outlier laws enacted by only a few
jurisdictions that choose intentionally to ignore the U.S. Constitution as written
and refuse to be bound by Supreme Court precedent.

1. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
2. E.g., Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82
VA. L. REV. 1, 16 (1996); Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction & Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349,
370 (1992).
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I. THE ROBERTS COURT SHOULD USE THE JURISPRUDENTIAL TOOLS AT ITS
DISPOSAL TO ENFORCE SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A. Carolene Products Footnote Four
One of the most mainstream and enduring theories of legal interpretation of
the U.S. Constitution3 is the one articulated in Footnote Four of the Supreme
Court’s 1938 opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Company.4
In Carolene Products, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether the
Carolene Products Company could be criminally indicted for shipping in
interstate commerce a compound of condensed skimmed milk and coconut oil
made in imitation or semblance of condensed milk or cream.5 The company
raised various constitutional challenges to the indictment, arguing that it was
beyond the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce and that the
indictment violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, as
well as the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, by depriving the
defendant of its property without due process of law.6
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the indictment could stand because the
underlying statute was constitutional.7 In so ruling, the Supreme Court applied
a broad reading of the Commerce Clause, and effectively held that statutes
restricting property rights or economic liberties would be upheld if the law in
question had a “rational basis” in fact or experience.
But the Supreme Court left itself a loophole to its newfound judicial restraint
for what it considered to be more important rights. The groundwork for this
judicial enforcement loophole was seeded by the opinion’s Footnote Four, which
is generally viewed as the most famous footnote in U.S. legal history.8
Footnote Four states:
There may be [a] narrower scope for operation of the presumption
of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
[A]mendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth. . . . It is unnecessary to consider now
whether legislation which restricts those political processes, which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,
is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types
3. See Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on
Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 685, 690
(1991).
4. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
5. Id. at 146.
6. Id. at 146–47.
7. Id. at 154.
8. Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene Products Footnote,
46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163, 165 (2004).
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of legislation. . . . Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations
enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, . . . or
national, . . . or racial minorities. . . or whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.9
Footnote Four empowers the Supreme Court to withhold its customary
deference to enactments by elected legislatures when a piece of contested
legislation “affect[s] rights specifically mentioned in the [C]onstitution;” when
it “interferes with the democratic process;” or when it “affects those ‘discrete
and insular minorities’ for whom the democratic process does not work fairly.”10
1. Footnote Four and Its Progeny Identify Three Situations Where Robust
Judicial Review of Legislation Is Justified
Legal scholars and commentators view the articulation of Footnote Four as a
“pivotal moment in the history of the Court.”11 The ideas the footnote expressed
“laid out the path the Court would follow in the twentieth century” to “protect[]
minorities and civil rights,” and “the political process.”12 Indeed, many
constitutional scholars are of the opinion that Footnote Four explains and
“encompasses much of the ensuing half-century of constitutional law.”13
Without belaboring the footnote’s history and the case law it helped inspire14,
it suffices to state that courts should give only limited deference to a legislature
when a statute or regulation concerns (a) the fundamental, enumerated
individual rights set forth in the Bill of Rights, incorporated against the states
via the Fourteenth Amendment (the “preferred freedoms doctrine”), (b) the
protection of various minority groups such as racial, national, or religious
groups, including groups that constitute “discrete and insular minorities”, and
(c) the protection of the voting processes necessary to ensure fair and free
elections and appropriate political representation.15
Two of the foregoing jurisprudential tools are potentially relevant to protect
Americans who seek to exercise their Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms: (a) the preferred freedoms doctrine, which permits the Court to exercise
greater judicial scrutiny of laws, which restrict rights or liberties guaranteed by

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Gilman, supra note 8, at 165–66.
Id. at 166.
Id.
See Farber and Frickey, supra note 3. See also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST (1980); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (1960).
14. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793 n.16 (1983); Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
15. See generally Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
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the first ten amendments,16 and (b) the doctrine protecting discrete and insular
minorities from hostile and oppressive laws enacted by local majorities.
2. Understanding Footnote Four’s First Jurisprudential Tool: The
Preferred Freedoms Doctrine
During the 1930s, the Supreme Court increased its vigilance when freedoms
of speech, press, or religion were at issue. In Palko v. Connecticut, the Court
distinguished fundamental rights, those that represented “the very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty,” as being entitled to greater protection against state
abridgment, in accordance with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.17 In Carolene Products Footnote Four, which was decided one
year later, the Court specifically allowed for enhanced judicial scrutiny of laws
that appear “to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those
of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth.”18
Originally, scholars understood the language in Footnote Four to evoke what
was known as the preferred freedoms position.19 As one commentator has
explained, “While modern scholars, critics and admirers alike, agree on the
political process, minority-representation interpretation [of Footnote Four], it is
very different from the early understanding of the footnote.”20 In its first
incarnation, Footnote Four stood for the opposite of value-free adjudication. It
stood instead for the “preferred position” of certain freedoms—a firmly valuebased position. As one commentator asserts:
The doctrine of the ‘preferred position’ was that personal rights
(meaning primarily freedom of speech and religion) were to be
preferred to (given more protection than) economic rights, not because
of their role in the political process, but because of their ‘sanctity,’
their ‘elevated rank in the hierarchy of values,’ or simply their ‘explicit
statement in the Bill of Rights.’21
The idea being that:
The usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the
preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable
democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment. That priority
16. A separate but related concept arising out of Carolene Products and similar Supreme
Court precedents is called the “Preferred Position.” This doctrine “expresses a judicial standard
based on a hierarchy of constitutional rights so that some constitutional freedoms are entitled to
greater protection than others.” Richard L. Pacelle Jr., Preferred Position Doctrine, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1008/preferredposition-doctrine (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
17. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
18. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4 (emphasis added).
19. Gilman, supra note 8, at 191.
20. Id. at 179.
21. Id.
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gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions. And it is the character of the right, not of the limitation,
which determines what standard governs the choice.22
The current understanding of Footnote Four is different from the original
understanding.23 Today, Footnote Four is considered significant because it
allows federal courts to ensure that the political processes are open and available
for “discrete and insular minorities” (category two) who would be
disenfranchised without court intervention.24 As commentators acknowledge,
“[t]oday, the footnote is understood as standing for an argument that attempts to
legitimate judicial review on the basis of the flaws in the political process.”25
The Roberts Court would be well-advised to go to back to the earliest
understanding of Footnote Four and learn from its teachings. The right to bear
arms, guaranteed by the Second Amendment and incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment, falls within Footnote Four’s doctrine of “preferred freedoms”;
thus, any legislation that attempts to restrict Second Amendment freedoms
should be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny and greater protection against
state abridgment.
3. Understanding Footnote Four’s Second Jurisprudential Tool: The
Concept of “Discrete and Insular Minorities”
Beyond the preferred freedoms doctrine, Footnote Four gives the courts
another equally important protective doctrine. For several decades, the Supreme
Court has drawn inspiration from Footnote Four’s phrase “discrete and insular
minorities.” This is the second jurisprudential tool created by Footnote Four,
which permits the Court to give only limited deference to the legislature.
To decide whether a group constitutes a discrete and insular minority, there is
a long list of factors a court considers. Some of those factors include whether
the person or group has been disadvantaged historically or has historically
lacked effective representation in the political process.26 Race, religion, national
origin, and alienage have figured prominently in making this determination, but
this list of relevant considerations is not exhaustive.
In Part III of this Article, I make the case that gun owners in certain hostile
jurisdictions are discrete and insular minorities lacking political power or
influence. When the current Supreme Court considers Carolene Products
22. Id. at 189 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945)) (statement of Justice
Rutledge) (citations omitted).
23. See id. at 183.
24. In short, “the Court polices the twin gates of the political process: voting and speech,” and
“the Court protects, through whatever constitutional provision is appropriate, those the government
stigmatizes.” L.A. Powe, Does Footnote Four Describe?, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 197, 197–98
(1994).
25. Gilman, supra note 8, at 167.
26. See Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2012),
appeal dismissed, 724 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2013).
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Footnote Four in the context of today’s ideological debates regarding Second
Amendment rights, the Court should take inspiration from the discrete and
insular minority doctrine.
B. The Supreme Court’s Historical Role of Enforcing Nationally Accepted
Norms Against Local Outliers Who Fail to Keep Up with the Mainstream
The Supreme Court has a long-standing practice of protecting constitutional
rights that are popular nationwide against infringement by outlier local
jurisdictions that seek to oppress local minorities. To illustrate: when the Court
struck down Connecticut’s ban on contraceptives in Griswold v. Connecticut27,
it was merely enforcing a mainstream national norm against an extremely
unusual local law. When the Court invalidated Texas’s sodomy law in Lawrence
v. Texas28, it was merely putting the final period on the handwriting that was
already on the wall for these types of laws.
But here, rather than requiring the Court to vindicate or invent a minority right
that has no “populist” or popular support in America (as opposed to vindicating
a purported right supported only by America’s urban, coastal elites), enforcing
the right to bear arms against a very few outlier jurisdictions fits squarely within
one of the Court’s traditional roles, that is, protecting local minorities from
hostile legislation that is out of step with, and contrary to, the national baseline.29
Unlike several other rights the Court has “discovered” in the Constitution—and
then enforced against majority will—the Second Amendment has strong
populist or popular support throughout most of the Nation.30 Vigorously
enforcing that right against the handful of outlier states and localities that
continue to refuse to fully recognize it is strongly supported by the Court’s
accepted role in protecting local minorities in those out-of-step jurisdictions
from being targeted by laws that are far outside the national mainstream.
II. APPLYING FOOTNOTE FOUR’S PREFERRED FREEDOMS DOCTRINE TO
SECOND AMENDMENT LITIGATION
It is well established that there is no “hierarchy among . . . constitutional
rights.”31 None other than Justice Felix Frankfurter explained this in his famous
dissent in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette. Justice
Frankfurter wrote,

27. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
28. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
29. See Klarman, supra note 2, at 16–18; Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 370.
30. “According to reports such as: ATF Firearms Commerce in the United States, ATF
AFMER and Congressional Research Service data, there are an estimated 434 million firearms in
civilian possession in the United States.” NSSF Releases Most Recent Firearm Production Figures,
NSSF (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.nssf.org/nssf-releases-most-recent-firearm-productionfigures/.
31. Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 628 (1989).
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[t]his Court has recognized, what hardly could be denied, that all the
provisions of the first ten Amendments are ‘specific’ prohibitions. . . .
But each specific Amendment, in so far as embraced within the
Fourteenth Amendment, must be equally respected, and the function
of this Court does not differ in passing on the constitutionality of
legislation challenged under different Amendments.32
As to the Second Amendment, the text and original understanding of the
document demand that conclusion. Those who framed and ratified the
Constitution did not assign “weights” to the various values, interests, and rights
they codified; nor did they attempt to list them in order of importance or provide
any basis for prioritizing some provisions over others. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has emphasized that the Second Amendment is not a “second-class
right”33 that can be “singled out for special—and specially unfavorable—
treatment.”34 To the contrary, the very text of the Second Amendment is phrased
in absolute terms (“the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed”35) unlike some other amendments that have some measure of
judgment built in (i.e., Fourth Amendment right to be secure against
“unreasonable searches and seizures”; Eighth Amendment prohibition against
“excessive bail” and “excessive fines”36).
Today’s gun owners rank the right to own guns as comparable in importance
to their individual rights to privacy, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and
the right to vote. 37 Like the founding generation that won the Revolution and
wrote the Bill of Rights, contemporary American gun owners regard the right to
bear arms as “the true palladium of liberty” in our republic.38 Gun owners and

32. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 648 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
33. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010) (plurality opinion).
34. Id. at 778–79.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, VIII.
37. Kim Parker, et al., America’s Complex Relationship With Guns 30 PEW RSCH. CTR. (June
22, 2017), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/06/22/americas-complex-relationship-withguns/.
38. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 769–70 (citations omitted)
(“Founding-era legal commentators confirmed the importance of the right to early
Americans. St. George Tucker, for example, described the right to keep and bear arms
as ‘the true palladium of liberty’ and explained that prohibitions on the right would place
liberty ‘on the brink of destruction. . . .’ ‘The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms
has justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers
a strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers; and will
generally, even if these are successful in the first instance, enable the people to resist and
triumph over them.’
Id. (quoting 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1890,
p. 746 (1833)).
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non-gun owners agree that “freedom of speech, the right to vote, the right to
privacy, and freedom of religion are essential to their own sense of freedom.”39
The preferred freedoms doctrine allows for enhanced judicial scrutiny of laws
that attempt to restrict the first ten amendments to our Constitution. The Second
Amendment falls squarely within this category of freedoms deserving of the
Court’s enhanced protection. The Court in Heller v. District of Columbia and
McDonald v. City of Chicago recognized the right to bear arms, which is
recognized by the Second Amendment, as a fundamental right.40 Throughout
the twentieth century, and as discussed supra41, the Supreme Court has widely
expanded the realm of protected activities under the First, Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. In contrast, when it comes to the Second Amendment, the
Supreme Court has largely remained silent, thereby permitting to go
unchallenged numerous restrictions—and not expansions—of that fundamental
right. The Roberts Court should follow the lead of the Warren and Burger Courts
and invoke the preferred freedoms doctrine articulated by Carolene Products
Footnote Four to enforce and broaden Second Amendment rights.
III. APPLYING FOOTNOTE FOUR’S DISCRETE AND INSULAR MINORITY
PROTECTION AND THE NATIONAL BASELINE DOCTRINE TO THOSE AMERICANS
SEEKING TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS IN POLITICALLY
HOSTILE METROPOLITAN AREAS
A. Gun Owners Are A Discrete and Insular Minority
Gun owners in those deep blue urban jurisdictions have a strong argument that
they are discrete and insular minorities under Footnote Four.42
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically held that members of the
LGBTQ community constitute a discrete and insular minority, it is still helpful
to discuss the sort of legal analysis that might ultimately give rise to such a
finding, which would have implications in the Second Amendment context.
Golinski v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management is an instructive 2012
opinion from the U.S. District Court from the Northern District of California.43
There, the district court found that homosexuals are entitled to the same
heightened legal protections as individuals falling within a recognized class of

39. Parker, supra note 3, at 30.
40. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561
U.S. 742, 780 (2010).
41. See supra Section I.
42. The concept of discrete and insular minorities arises usually in the context of Equal
Protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. But that does not mean that a class of gun
owners cannot benefit from the inspiration and analysis of Carolene Products Footnote Four when
they assert various legal claims including, but not limited to, claims under the Second and
Fourteenth Amendments.
43. Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 974 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
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discrete and insular minorities, like African Americans or women. The Golinski
court reasoned:
[T]he court in High Tech Gays, in performing the analysis of the issue
of whether the legislature’s classification based on homosexuality
calls for heightened scrutiny, relied on the mistaken assumption that
sexual orientation is merely ‘behavioral,’ rather than the sort of deeply
rooted, immutable characteristic that warrants heightened protection
from discrimination. . . . The court found that “[h]omosexuality is not
an immutable characteristic; it is behavioral and hence fundamentally
different from traits such as race, gender, or alienage, which define
already existing suspect and quasi-suspect classes. The behavior of
such already recognized classes is irrelevant to their identification’. . .
. The Supreme Court has since rejected this artificial distinction,
noting that its more recent precedent ‘have declined to distinguish
between status and conduct in the context’ of sexual orientation. . . .
In Lawrence, the Court noted that ‘when homosexual conduct is made
criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination. . . .’
‘While it is true that the law applies only to conduct, the conduct
targeted by this law is conduct that is closely correlated with being
homosexual. Under such circumstances, the law is targeted at more
than conduct. It is instead directed toward gay persons as a class.’
Accordingly, the analysis of the Ninth Circuit in High Tech Gays on
the appropriateness of applying heightened scrutiny to gay men and
lesbians because their defining characteristic is immutable has been
severely undermined by more recent and overriding precedent.44
The Golinski court proceeded to analyze the factors to determine whether a
class is entitled to suspect status and thus deserving of heightened scrutiny.
First, it found that “lesbians and gay men have experienced a long history of
discrimination.”45 So have gun owners in outlier states, which have subjected
them to long prison terms for peaceable activity, such as the mere possession of
a handgun (Chicago and some of its suburbs) , or a firearm that is not registered
(District of Columbia), or common rifles that are not registered (New York), or
ammunition without a state-issued firearms identification card (Illinois) or
simple possession of a magazine holding more than ten rounds, or bringing
ammunition into the jurisdiction from out of state.46

44. Id. at 984–85 (citations omitted).
45. Id. at 985.
46. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 265.01-b; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:39-3(j), 2C:395(a), 2C:43-3(b)(2), 2C:43-6(a)(4), 2C:44-1(f); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-202w(b), (c), 53a-35a;
D.C. CODE § 7-2502.01(a); CAL. PENAL CODE § 30314 (2020); 430 ILCS § 65/2(a); N.Y.C.
ADMIN. CODE § 10-303.

2020]

Second-Class Rights and Second-Class Americans

93

Second, the court found that “sexual orientation has no relevance to a person’s
ability to contribute to society.”47 At least as much could be said for gun owners,
who may make extraordinary contributions to society in times of danger or
war.48
Third, the court considered whether a characteristic “is immutable or
otherwise not within the members’ control,” and then softened that factor when
it found that “a person’s sexual orientation is so fundamental to one’s identity
that a person should not be required to abandon it.”49 Based on history, culture,
and the innate human drive to survive, gun ownership may be as fundamental to
one’s identity as any other characteristic. The massive lines surrounding gun
stores across the United States during the 2020 Coronavirus crisis and summer
riots illustrates the point. As I wrote elsewhere, “[s]hopping lists across the
country, in addition to including toilet paper, hand sanitizer, and canned goods,
now suddenly list firearms at the top.”50 So too does the fact that the
overwhelming number of states including New Jersey, Illinois and Delaware
(not to mention the United States Department of Homeland Security) declared
firearms stores to be “essential businesses” that were permitted to stay open
during the crisis.51
Fourth and last, the court applied the factor of whether the subject group is “a
minority or politically powerless,” finding that “although not completely
politically powerless, the gay and lesbian community lacks meaningful political
power,” and are “a politically vulnerable minority.”52
That is indisputably the plight of gun owners in outlier states, which in many
legislative sessions are faced with increased restrictions and the creation of new
minefields that gun owners must traverse at the risk of felony convictions and
imprisonment.53 Gun owners in states such as New York, New Jersey, and
California have long suffered abuse for seeking to exercise their fundamental

47. Id. at 986.
48. See Stephen P. Halbrook, Nazism, the Second Amendment, and the NRA: A Reply to
Professor Harcourt, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 113, 128–30 (2006); David B. Kopel, Lethal Laws,
15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 355, 374–78 (1995).
49. Golinski, 824 F.Supp. 2d at 986–87.
50. Mark W. Smith, Second Amendment Historian Stephen Halbrook Demonstrates that
Americans Have—and Always Had—a Fundamental Right to Carry Firearms Outside of the Home,
FEDSOC BLOG (March 31, 2020), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/fedsoc-blog/second-amendmenthistorian-stephen-halbrook-demonstrates-that-americans-have-and-always-had-a-fundamentalright-to-carry-firearms-outside-of-the-home.
51. Zusha Elinson, Gun Stores Ruled Essential Businesses During Coronavirus Shutdowns,
WALL ST. J. (March 30, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/gun-stores-ruled-essentialbusinesses-during-coronavirus-shutdowns-11585601189.
52. Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 987–89 (citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987)).
53. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 265.01-b; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:39-3(j), 2C:395(a), 2C:43-3(b)(2), 2C:43-6(a)(4), 2C:44-1(f); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-202w(b), (c), 53a-35a;
D.C. CODE § 7-2502.01(a); CAL. PENAL CODE § 30314 (2020); 430 ILCS § 65/2(a); N.Y.C.
ADMIN. CODE § 10-303.
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right to keep and bear arms: New York Governor Andrew Cuomo suggested that
gun owners leave New York;54 San Francisco declared a gun rights group a
“domestic terrorist” organization;55 “New York routinely flouts federal
protections for traveling with firearms by arresting and prosecuting air travel
passengers who have checked firearms in their baggage.”56 New York City
requires a “premises license” merely to possess a handgun within the home, and
with extremely limited exceptions the licensee cannot carry the handgun outside
the four walls of his or her home. The license takes at least six months to obtain,
requires an in-person interview, and involves intrusive inquiries into everything
from the applicant’s criminal history, mental health, failure to pay debts, driving
history, and “moral character.” It can be denied or revoked at the City’s sole
discretion. Only a little over 1% of households have such a license. In short,
the “right” to keep and bear arms is destroyed for most City residents.57
Based on the above four factors, the Golinski court held that “gay men and
lesbians are a group deserving of heightened protection against the prejudices
and power of an often-antagonistic majority.”58 The district court deemed gay
men and lesbians to be a discrete and insular minority, thus legislation adversely
affecting homosexuals was subject to heightened scrutiny.
As articulated above, Americans seeking to exercise their right to keep and
bear arms are akin to the gay men and lesbians in the Golinski case. The act of
owning, possessing or using a firearm is, at the most basic level, a behavior or
form of conduct, precisely the finding of the district court in Golinski concerning
gay men and lesbians.59 Though gun ownership is a voluntary activity, there
appears to be little reason why this alone would cause Second Amendment
advocates to fall outside the additional protections afforded to “discrete and
insular minorities.” There can be no more inherent, essential human trait than
the urge to protect oneself, one’s family, and one’s community from harm.60 By
virtue of their conduct alone, gun owners in hostile jurisdictions constitute a
discrete and insular minority entitled to additional protections under the law.
54. Heather Long, Opinion, Conservatives Aren’t Welcome in New York, According to
Governor Cuomo, GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2014, 8:49 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2014/jan/24/governor-cuomo-conservatives-not-welcome-new-york.
55. Janie Harr, NRA Declares Victory over San Francisco’s ‘Terrorist’ Resolution,
MERCURY NEWS (Oct. 2, 2020, 5:43 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/10/02/nra-sanfrancisco-mayor-retreats-on-terrorist-resolution.
56. E.g., Torraco v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 615 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2010).
See discussion in STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FIREARMS LAW DESKBOOK § 4.7 (2020).
57. New York State Rifle and Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2018),
rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1526 (2020) (per curiam) (Alito, J., dissenting).
58. Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 989–90 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
59. See id. at 985 (stating that “[t]he Supreme Court has since rejected this artificial
distinction, noting that its more recent precedent ‘have declined to distinguish between status and
conduct in the context’ of sexual orientation.”). (emphasis added).
60. See David Kopel, The Religious Roots of the American Revolution and the Right to Keep
and Bear Arms, 17 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 167, 172 (2005).
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B. Gun Owners Constitute A Discrete and Insular Minority Group
in Politically Hostile Metropolitan Areas
Lawful gun use and ownership are enormously popular and widespread
nationwide61, which is contrary to what many in the mainstream media would
have you believe. Following its 2010 decision in McDonald, during the
Supreme Court’s nearly decade-long hiatus from Second Amendment
jurisprudence, the popularity and significance of the Second Amendment
continued to grow. Forty-four out of the fifty states allow law-abiding and
responsible citizens to carry firearms in public without any particularly onerous
obstacles.62 Specifically, about twenty-six states now recognize the right to
carry a handgun in public for self-defense by issuing gun permits to all
qualifying, law-abiding adults on a “shall issue” basis.63 In eighteen states, no
carry permit is required for citizens to carry a concealed firearm.64 There are
somewhere between six and eight outlier states that significantly restrict the
Second Amendment rights of their residents (and other Americans who happen
to be passing through).65
61. See infra, Part III.B.1.a; Lydia Saad, What Percentage of Americans Own Guns?, GALLUP
(Aug. 14, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/264932/percentage-americans-own-guns.aspx
(“Thirty percent of U.S. adults say they personally own a gun, while a larger percentage, 43%,
report living in a gun household.”); Larry Keane, Americans Vote Yes in a Landslide for Gun Sales,
NSSF, (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.nssf.org/americans-vote-yes-in-a-landslide-for-gun-sales/
(“NSSF [National Shooting Sports Foundation] released the adjusted National Instant Criminal
Background Check System (NICS) figures for October [2020]. They aren’t record-breaking.
They’re a record-shattering 1.76 million background checks completed for the sale of a firearm
across the nation. That brings the annual total to 17.2 million, leaving the previous record in the
rear-view mirror. That was 15.7 million background checks in 2016, also an election year, when
Hillary Clinton promised to re-enact the failed 1994 Assault Weapons Ban.”).
62. Stephen Halbrook, To Bear Arms for Self-Defense: A “Right of the People” or a Privilege
of
the
Few?
Part
1,
FEDERALIST
SOC.
REV.
(Mar.
2020),
https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/to-bear-arms-for-self-defense-a-right-of-the-peopleor-a-privilege-of-the-few.
63. At least forty-two states, in fact, either have a de jure or de facto “shall issue” system, or
don’t require a permit for public carry at all. See Gun Laws, NAT’L RIFLE ASSOC. INST. LEGIS.
ACTION, https://www.nraila.org/gun-laws (last visited Oct. 10, 2020). Another two states are
formally “may issue” but typically “shall issue” in practice. See Halbrook, supra note 62. Of note,
so-called “shall-issue” states are states in which the issuing authorities are required to issue a permit
to an applicant who meets an objective statutory criteria. In contrast, so-called “may issue” states
are states that grant government actors, often law enforcement agents, greater discretion in granting
or denying requests for carry permits. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-717, GUN
CONTROL: STATES’ LAWS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR CONCEALED CARRY PERMITS VARY ACROSS
THE NATION 2 (2012).
64. U.S. Constitutional Carry Association Constitutional Carry/Unrestricted/Permitless
Carry, USCCA, https://www.usconcealedcarry.com/resources/terminology/types-of-concealedcarry-licensurepermitting-policies/unrestricted/.
65. The following six states ban either the carrying or possession of a handgun without a
license, issuance of which is limited at the discretion of a governmental entity based on standardless criteria like “good cause:” California, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
York. See CA. PENAL CODE §§ 25400, 26150(a)(2), 26155(a)(2); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 134-9, 134-
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That the vast majority of states fully respect the right to bear arms does not
detract from the assertion that gun owners residing in the few outlier or
metropolitan majority jurisdictions constitute discrete and insular minorities.
That the right to bear arms is an extremely popular right nationwide only
highlights the extreme injustice suffered by Second Amendment enthusiasts
residing in the eight or so outlier jurisdictions that severely restrict guns. These
Americans lack political power or influence in those jurisdictions and, as a
consequence, they enjoy far fewer Second Amendment freedoms when
compared to gun owners in the other forty-two states. Because the existence and
exercise of a fundamental Constitutional right should not be dependent on an
American citizen’s state of residency, gun owners in these outlier jurisdictions
are discrete and insular minorities in need of the Supreme Court’s protection.
1. The Great American Gun Control Debate Is About Culture and Values
The debate over the Second Amendment and gun control is less about crime
rates, risk assessment, or policy choices than values and culture.66 Those who
embrace the right to keep and bear arms “tend to be rural, Southern or
Western,”67 and for them “guns symbolize a cluster of positive values,”
including honor, independence, and “individual self-sufficiency.”68
51(a); MD. CODE, CRIM. LAW, §§ 4-203(a), (b)(2), 4-303(a), MD. CODE. PUB. SAFETY § 5306(a)(6)(ii); MASS. GEN. LAW 140 §§ 131(a), (b), (d); 269 § 10(a); N.J. STAT. 2C:39-5(b), 2C:584(d); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.01, 265.20(a)(3), § 400.00(2), (3), (7). See also Gun Laws, NRAILA, https://www.nraila.org/gun-laws/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2020). Connecticut is technically a
may-issue state for purposes of concealed carry permits, but it operates more like a shall-issue state.
While CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29–28(b) says the authority “may issue” a carry permit, that statute
specifies detailed objective requirements (like training) and disqualifications (like a felony record).
In Kuck v. Danaher the court noted that the issuing authority “is afforded circumscribed discretion
to determine whether a particular applicant seeking a pistol permit would pose a danger to the
public if entrusted with a firearm.” 822 F. Supp.2d 109, 129 (D. Conn. 2011). There is no
requirement that the applicant show “need” or “good cause.” Illinois requires a Firearms Owner
Identification card to possess either a firearm or ammunition. However, the disqualifying criteria
(though considerably broader than under federal law) are largely objective in nature. Illinois is a
shall-issue state for concealed carry permits.
66. Dan M. Kahan, The Gun Control Debate: A Culture-Theory Manifesto, 60 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 3, 3 (2003); Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear of
Gun Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate, 55 EMORY L.
J. 569, 571 (2006); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural
Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1293–94 (2003); Gary Kleck, Crime,
Culture Conflict and the Sources of Support for Gun Control: A Multilevel Application of the
General Social Surveys, 39 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCI. 387, 400–01 (1996); WILLIAM R. TONSO, GUN
AND SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL AND EXISTENTIAL ROOTS OF THE AMERICAN ATTACHMENT TO
FIREARMS (1982); JAMES D. WRIGHT, ET AL., UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME AND VIOLENCE
IN AMERICA (1983); RICHARD SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION: THE MYTH OF THE FRONTIER IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1992).
67. Kahan, supra note 66, at 4.
68. Id.; see Wright, supra note 66, at 113 (stating values of gun culture “are best typified as
rural rather than urban: they emphasize independence, self-sufficiency, mastery over nature,
closeness to the land”).
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In contrast, those who disparage or discount the Second Amendment are
disproportionately coastal, “urban” and “Eastern.”69 They deem guns to be
“abhorrent and alarming” vestiges of a violent, primeval and alien past, while
viewing gun control as “symbolizing a competing set of positive values,”
including “civilized nonaggression . . . and social solidarity.”70 This is a clash
of cultures—a fundamental disagreement about “alternative views of what
America is and ought to be.”71 And “[i]n such disputes, citizens care less about
how a particular law will [actually] affect behavior [and public safety] than they
do about what the adoption of that law will say about the authority of contested
moral values and about the relative status of the social groups and cultural styles
associated with those values.”72
“During the 1960s and 1970s, a tremendous cultural shift took place among
American elites” with respect to firearms: “[i]n 1960, it was unexceptional that
a liberal Northeastern Democrat, such as John F. Kennedy, would join the
NRA.”73 “But by the early 1970s, gun ownership itself was reviled by much of
the urban intelligentsia,”74 who complained bitterly that “‘Americans cling with
pathetic stubbornness’ to ‘the supposed right to bear arms,’ and refuse to adopt
European-style gun control laws.”75 The notion of guns for self-defense in the
hands of common citizens came to be seen as an insult to a modern,
sophisticated, and well-ordered society.76
The urban liberals of the North and East, who for decades had been content
with the U.S. Supreme Court writing their values into law, were dismayed
because Heller and McDonald instead vindicated values championed largely in
the small towns and rural heartlands of the South, the Midwest, and the
Mountain states.77 Furthermore, a simple review of state maps in even deep blue
states like New York demonstrate that the deep progressive, anti-gun views are
limited to a distinct minority of counties within the state.78

69. Kahan, supra note 66, at 4.
70. Id. at 4–5.
71. Id. at 6.
72. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
73. David B. Kopel, The Great Gun Control War of the Twentieth Century—And Its Lessons
for Gun Laws Today, 39 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1527, 1553 (2012).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1553–54 (quoting the celebrated scholar of American history—and two-time winner
of the Pulitzer Prize—Professor Richard Hofstadter).
76. See id. at 1554.
77. See Kahan, supra note 66, at 4; Terry L. Schell, et al., State-Level Estimates of Household
Firearm Ownership, RAND CORPORATION 21 (April 21, 2020), https://www.rand.org/
pubs/tools/TL354.html (Chart of household gun ownership rates of all fifty states shows the highest
in Montana at 66% to the lowest in Massachusetts at 15%).
78. David LaPell, Why Don’t Gun Owners Just Move From Where They Lose Their Rights?,
AMMOLAND (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.ammoland.com/2018/12/why-dont-gun-owners-movelose-their-rights/.
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a. Enforcing the Right To Bear Arms Fits Squarely Within The Supreme
Court’s Role of Protecting Minorities
Rather than requiring the Court to vindicate or invent a minority right that has
no populist or popular support in America, enforcing the right to bear arms
against a very few outlier jurisdictions fits squarely within one of the Court’s
traditional roles, that is, protecting local minorities from hostile legislation that
is out of step with, and contrary to, the national baseline.79
According to Pew Research Center, which is hardly part of a vast right-wing
conspiracy, “at least two-thirds of American adults have lived in a household
with one or more guns at some point in their lives.”80 Approximately forty-one
percent of U.S. adults say they live in a gun-owning household.81 About sixtysix percent of American adults either currently own a gun or say that they might
own one in the future.82 About forty-eight percent of U.S. adults say they grew
up in a gun-owing household.83 About sixty-seven percent of all gun owners
say that a major reason for owing a gun is self-protection.84 Fifty-eight percent
of male gun owners go to a shooting range, thirty-seven percent go hunting,
twenty-seven attend gun shows, forty-three watch gun-oriented television or
videos, thirty-nine frequent gun websites, and about one in ten gun owners
participate in online forums or listen to podcasts or radio shows about guns.85
Over 19 million Americans (some seven percent of the adult population) are
licensed to carry a concealed firearm.86 This last figure is actually an
underestimate because there are eighteen “constitutional carry” states that do not
require any sort of permit to carry. Even in those states that require a permit to
carry a concealed handgun, most allow open carry without a permit. So, how
many more people than these 19 million are carrying guns outside of the home
every day and are doing so legally without a permit?
Assuming that the Pew numbers about U.S. adults are reasonably correct, then
that means the following (using 2019 population figures):
• More than 169 million adult Americans have lived in a home with one
or more guns at some point during their lives.87

79. See Klarman, supra note 2, at 16; Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 370.
80. Parker, supra note 37, at 4.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 16.
83. Id. at 23.
84. Id. at 8, 21.
85. Id. at 8.
86. New Concealed Carry Report for 2020: 19.48 Million Permit Holders, 820,000 More
Than Last Year Despite Many States Shutting Down Issuing Permits because of the Coronavirus,
CRIME PREVENTION RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 2, 2020), https://crimeresearch.org/2020/10/new-concealedcarry-report-for-2020-19-48-million-permitholders-820000-more-than-last-year-despite-manystates-shutting-down-issuing-permits-becauseof-the-coronavirus/.
87. 328,239,523 total U.S. population times 77.6 percent (percentage of population over 18
years of age) equals 254,713,869 adults. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Quick Facts, (July 1, 2019),
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•

More than 104 million adult Americans currently live in a gun-owning
household.88
• More than 168 million adult Americans either currently own a firearm
or say that they might own a firearm in the future.89
• More than 122 million adult Americans grew up in households with
firearms.90
Almost 20 million American have permits to conceal carry firearms, and this
number is likely a gross underestimate of the number of Americans who carry
firearms outside of the home.91 The almost 20 million figure is likely an
underestimate because many states stopped or slowed their issuance of
concealed handgun permits during the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic, and another
issue arises from the fact that in approximately eighteen states, citizens may
carry firearms without a permit.
The right to bear arms is thus an extremely popular right nationwide. It is not
akin to the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade in which the Court
struck down at a single stroke popularly adopted abortion restrictions in 30
states92; a then anti-majoritarian decision whose timing even the late Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg has previously criticized.93
Instead, the right to keep and bear arms should fit a different philosophical
model: the Supreme Court’s practice of protecting constitutional rights that are
popular nationwide against infringement by local outliers in local jurisdictions
oppressing local minorities. It is this model that caused the Supreme Court to
strike down Connecticut’s ban on contraceptives in Griswold v. Connecticut,
which merely enforced a mainstream national norm against an extremely
unusual local law, and to invalidate Texas’s anti-sodomy in Lawrence.94
So too with the right to bear arms. Given their status as extreme outliers, “may
issue” permit carry laws and similar firearms regulations and restrictions are
arguably the modern analogues of bans on contraceptives in the 1960s. “May
issue” gun control laws give government law enforcement agencies (frequently
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219. 254,713,869 multiplied by 2/3 of
American adults equals 169,639,439. See also Parker, supra note 37, at 4.
88. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 87; see also Parker, supra note 37, at 4.
89. Id.
90. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 87; see also Parker, supra note 37, at 23.
91. New Concealed Carry Report For 2020: 19.48 Million Permit Holders, 820,000 More
Than Last Year Despite Many States Shutting Down Issuing Permits because of the Coronavirus,
CRIME
PREVENTION
RESEARCH
CENTER
(October
2,
2020),
https://crimeresearch.org/2020/10/new-concealed-carry-report-for-2020-19-48-million-permitholders-820000-more-than-last-year-despite-many-states-shutting-down-issuing-permits-becauseof-the-coronavirus/.
92. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 118 n.2 (1973).
93. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Justice Ginsburg: Roe v. Wade Decision Came Too Soon, ABA
J. (Feb. 13, 2012, 12:29 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/justice_ginsburg_roe_
v._wade_decision_came_too_soon.
94. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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overseen by local politicians who are hostile to gun rights) the discretion to
decide which citizens have government permission to possess or carry firearms.
Gun owners living today in Manhattan or San Francisco face the same
challenges as earlier local minorities living in hostile jurisdictions. These “may
issue” jurisdictions are out of step with the national mainstream both
constitutionally and in reality, and they should be brought in line with the rest of
the country.
It is not a coincidence that all of the Supreme Court decisions that
reinvigorated the Second Amendment in the 21st century arose as challenges to
draconian handgun bans enacted by large urban governments in the North and
East95: most prominently, Dick Heller sued the District of Columbia and Otis
McDonald sued Chicago.96 When those cases were argued before the Court,
more than three dozen States—from Texas to Michigan, from Washington to
Virginia—filed an amicus brief urging the Court to recognize an individual right
to keep and bear arms.97 Only three States—Illinois, Maryland, and New
Jersey—urged the Supreme Court to repudiate any such individual right and to
uphold the challenged municipal ban on handguns.98
Today, gun owners are a discrete and insular minority in the heavily urbanized
North. And just as the segregationists of the States of the former Confederacy
had contempt for their citizens’ right to equal protection of the law, those living
in large urban centers or “metropolitan majorities”99—New York (New York
City), New Jersey (Newark and Trenton), Massachusetts (Boston), Maryland
(Baltimore), the District of Columbia, plus Illinois (Chicago), California (many
jurisdictions, including San Francisco and Los Angeles) and Hawaii
(Honolulu)—have contempt for their citizens’ right to bear arms.100 The
95. These are the types of urban jurisdictions that former Chicago Mayor and President
Obama’s former chief of staff Rahm Emmanuel recently referred to as Metropolitan Majorities.
Rahm Emanuel Democrats May be Blowing Their Chance, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/democrats-may-be-blowing-their-chance-11580514064.
96. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573 (2008) (striking down “a District
of Columbia prohibition on the possession of usable handguns in the home.”); McDonald v. City
of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010) (striking down a Chicago ordinance “effectively banning
handgun possession by almost all private citizens who reside in the City.”). The case that would
have been the Supreme Court’s third Second Amendment decision involved a challenge to an
ordinance enacted by New York City, but the case was held to be rendered moot by an amendment
to the ordinance. See New York State Rifle and Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2d
Cir. 2018), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (per curiam). Finally, the per curiam decision in Caetano
v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016), likewise involved a law enacted by a Northern urban
state.
97. E.g., Brief of the States of Texas et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (No. 08-1521).
98. See Brief for the States of Ill., Md., and N.J. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (No. 08-1521).
99. Emanuel, supra note 95.
100. Finding further proof that these urban elites view their fellow countrymen and women in
rural America with disdain, one need look no further than the comments by Hillary Rodham Clinton
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national divide on the Second Amendment is a canyon, not a ditch—there is a
yawning chasm between two groups of Americans who caricature and demonize
one another. On one side are the “effete” members of the self-proclaimed
metropolitan intelligentsia; on the other are the rural, working-class and smalltown voters of middle America whom then-Presidential-candidate Barack
Obama once described as “bitter” people who “cling to guns or religion” as a
way to vent their frustrations with life.101 Then-presidential candidate Hillary
Rodham Clinton offered a similar comment when she referred to many of
Donald Trump’s supporters as a “basket of deplorables.”102
b. Is the Supreme Court Finally Getting It?
Until the New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. City of New York case
before the Court in the 2019 term,103 the Supreme Court had not heard oral
argument in a Second Amendment case since 2010, when the Court struck down
Chicago’s total ban on private ownership of handguns.104 And while the Court
granted review in the City of New York case, the City amended its ordinance –
which had prohibited transporting a handgun outside of the licensed premises —
in a manner that, according to the majority, gave the petitioners the relief they
sought, rendering the case moot.105 Concurring, Justice Kavanaugh opined that
“some federal and state courts may not be properly applying Heller and
McDonald” and that the Court “should address that issue soon . . . .”106
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Gorsuch and Justice Thomas, dissented,
arguing that the case was not moot.107 On the merits, Justice Alito would have
held that the amended ordinance violated the Second Amendment. No
comparable laws existed when the Second Amendment was adopted,108 the
lower court failed to apply heightened scrutiny in holding that the law promoted
that Trump-supporters are “deplorables,” from Obama that rural Americans “cling to their guns,”
and from New York governor Andrew Cuomo that if you support gun rights, then you should move
out of New York. Katie Reilly, Read Hillary Clinton’s ‘Basket of Deplorable’ Remarks About
Donald Trump Supporters, TIME (Sept. 10, 2016), https://time.com/4486502/hillary-clintonbasket-of-deplorables-transcript/. See Long, supra note 54.
101. See Janell Ross, Obama Revives His ‘Cling to Guns or Religion’ Analysis—for Donald
Trump Supporters, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2015), www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2015/12/21/obama-dusts-off-his-cling-to-guns-or-religion-idea-for-donaldtrump/?utm_term=.f881de79fa3e (quoting Obama).
102. Reilly, supra note 100.
103. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573 (2008); McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010); New York State Rifle and Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York,
883 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2018), vacated and remanded, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (per curiam); Caetano
v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016).
104. Oral argument was heard in McDonald v. Chicago on March 2, 2010.
105. New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525,
1526 (2020) (per curiam).
106. Id. (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 1533 (Alito, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 1541.
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public safety,109 and the ordinance violated the very right recognized in
Heller.110
In contrast, in that same period, the Justices heard arguments in approximately
three dozen cases involving the First Amendment and two dozen cases involving
the Fourth Amendment, even though those constitutional provisions—unlike the
Second Amendment—have for many decades been the subject of enormous
bodies of Supreme Court precedent. In the words of Justice Thomas, “[t]his
discrepancy is inexcusable.”111 For judges “who work in marbled halls, guarded
constantly by a vigilant and dedicated police force, the guarantees of the Second
Amendment might seem antiquated and superfluous. But the Framers made a
clear choice: They reserved to all Americans the right to bear arms for selfdefense.”112 The federal courts should not “stand by idly while a State denies
its citizens that right, particularly when their very lives may depend on it.”113
The Roberts Court should take inspiration from Carolene Products Footnote
Four and its discrete and insular minorities jurisprudence and protect those
Americans seeking to exercise their fundamental constitutional rights to keep
and bear arms in politically hostile metropolitan areas. Or, perhaps, the Roberts
Court should deploy the Supreme Court’s longstanding national baseline test to
protect these same Americans who desire to do nothing more than enjoy the
freedom to bear arms like the Americans in the vast majority of jurisdictions
across the United States.
IV. NOW IS THE TIME FOR THE SUPREME COURT TO USE THE
JURISPRUDENTIAL TOOLS AT ITS DISPOSAL UNDER FOOTNOTE FOUR AND THE
COURT’S NATIONAL BASELINE PROTECTION DOCTRINE TO PROTECT THE
SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF AMERICANS LIVING UNDER METROPOLITAN
MAJORITIES
In the years since deciding Heller (2008) and McDonald (2010), the Supreme
Court has failed to use the jurisprudential tools at its disposal to ensure that the
fundamental right to keep and bear arms is accorded protection on a par with
other enumerated constitutional rights. Regardless of the jurisprudential
methodology you apply (originalism, Warren/Burger era jurisprudence or
otherwise), the Supreme Court must do more to protect gun owners.
The Supreme Court was well ahead of American public sentiment when it
ventured into the areas of abortion and gay rights. Even those who support
abortion rights recognize that the Court “may have moved too quickly when it

109. Id. at 1541-42.
110. Id. at 1544.
111. Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1999 (2017) (Thomas, J., joined by Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
112. Id. at 1999.
113. Id. at 2000.
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found a constitutional right to abortion in Roe v. Wade,114 according to the late
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.”115 During a speech at a Columbia Law School
symposium in 2012, Justice Ginsburg surveyed four decades of electoral and
judicial controversy on abortion and noted that, rather than granting review in
Roe, the Supreme Court could have delayed hearing the case while state law
evolved on the issue: “It’s not that the judgment was wrong, but it moved too far
too fast,” she said.116 Alternatively, she noted, the Court could have invalidated
the particular Texas statute “without finding a right to privacy that overturned
abortion bans nationwide,” contending that “[t]hings might have turned out
differently if the Court had been more restrained.”117 When Roe v. Wade was
decided in 1973, women could legally seek an abortion in only four states
although abortions were available on a limited basis in about sixteen other
states.118
The Supreme Court was also ahead of public sentiment when it legalized gay
marriage, although the gap between the Court and the American electorate was
perhaps not as wide. In 2012, same-sex marriage was legal in only six states.119
By 2013, when the Court struck down the federal Defense of Marriage Act120—
which had barred federal recognition of same-sex unions—twelve states had
made gay marriage legal.121 However, “the vast majority of states [still]
ban[ned] such unions, and 31 of them ha[d] amended their constitutions to
enshrine the traditional definition of heterosexual marriage.”122
The treatment of the right to keep and bear arms in the federal courts stands
in stark contrast. Rather than being ahead of popular opinion or at least keeping
pace with it, the federal judiciary has lagged well behind it. For decades the
federal courts routinely and almost summarily rejected Second Amendment
claims. For example, in 1982 the Seventh Circuit in Chicago upheld a municipal
114. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
115. See Weiss, supra note 93.
116. Id.
117. Id. See also Robert Barnes, The Forgotten History of Justice Ginsburg’s criticism of Roe
v. Wade, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/theforgotten-history-of-justice-ginsburgs-criticism-of-roe-v-wade/2016/03/01/9ba0ea2e-dfe8-11e59c36-e1902f6b6571_story.html?utm_term=.a8da74208a01.
118. See Weiss, supra note 93.
119. See id.
120. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
121. James Richardson, Why Supreme Court’s Gay Marriage Ruling Won’t be Like Roe v.
Wade,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(June
10,
2013),
https://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2013/0610/Why-Supreme-Court-s-gaymarriage-ruling-won-t-be-like-Roe-v.-Wade.
122. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court to Hear Same-Sex Marriage Cases, WASH. POST (Dec. 7,
2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2012/12/07/4bf6c366-40ab-11e2-ae43cf491b837f7b_story.html?utm_term=.c9320e4433a8 (The Court legalized gay marriage
nationwide in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015)); see also Lyle Denniston, Opinion
Analysis: Marriage Now Open to Same-Sex Couples, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2015, 3:01 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/opinion-analysis-marriage-now-open-to-same-sex-couples/.
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ordinance outlawing the possession of handguns even in one’s home.123 The
Supreme Court refused to hear the appeal and that decision remained the law for
a quarter-century until a similar ban on handguns in Washington, D.C. was
overturned in 2008 in the Court’s landmark Heller decision. Until 2001, in the
Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Emerson,124 no federal appellate court
had held that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and
bear arms for purely private, civilian purposes.125 Many lower federal courts
continued—right up to the Heller decision—to rule that the Second Amendment
protects only the states’ prerogatives with respect to their militias and does not
recognize an individual right.126
In the decade since the Supreme Court reinvigorated the Second Amendment
with its originalist decisions in Heller and McDonald, the individual right to
keep and bear arms has been ill-used by, and when used, abused by, the lower
federal courts.127 Those lower federal courts have upheld: (1) statutes from New
York, New Jersey, Maryland and California denying law-abiding citizens the
right to carry a concealed weapon for self-defense;128 (2) laws from Illinois,
Maryland, New York, Connecticut and the District of Columbia banning widely
popular and commonly owned semiautomatic rifles and ammunition
magazines;129 (3) a California ban on the sale of types of ammunition commonly

123. See Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 263–64 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
124. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Haney, 264 F.3d 1161, 1164–66 (10th Cir. 2001); United States
v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 402–04 (6th Cir. 2000); Gillespie v. Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710–11
(7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1271–74 (11th Cir. 1997); United States
v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 285–86 (3d Cir. 1996); Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 100–03 (9th Cir.
1996); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1018–20 (8th Cir. 1992); Thomas v. Members of City
Council, 730 F.2d 41, 42 (1st Cir. 1984) (per curiam); United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550
(4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); United States v. Johnson, 441 F.2d 1134, 1136 (5th Cir. 1971).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Lippman, 369 F.3d 1039, 1043–1044 (8th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Parker, 362 F.3d 1279, 1282–1284 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Jackubowski, 63 F.
App’x 959, 960 (7th Cir. 2003); Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1060–1066 (9th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Milheron, 231 F. Supp. 2d 376, 378 (D. Me. 2002); Bach v. Pataki, 289 F. Supp.
2d 217, 224–226 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
127. See Stephen P. Halbrook, To Bear Arms for Self-Defense: A “Right of the People” or a
Privilege of the Few?, 21 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 56 (2020).
128. See, e.g., Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.
Ct. 1995 (2017); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1100 (2014);
Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 952 (2013); Kachalsky v.
Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 918 (2013). See also David
G. Savage, Supreme Court Won’t Hear a California Gun Case, Leaving in Place the State’s Strict
Limits on Concealed Weapons, L.A. TIMES (June 26, 2017, 12:55 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-court-handguns-california-20170626-story.html.
129. See, e.g., Friedman v. Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.
Ct. 447 (2015); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016); Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 469
(2017); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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used for self-defense by both civilians and law-enforcement officers;130 and (4)
a California law mandating waiting periods for the purchase of firearms.131 In
sum, as Justice Clarence Thomas, Justice Neil Gorsuch, and the late Justice
Antonin Scalia have protested, “the lower courts are resisting th[e] [Supreme]
Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald.”132 This unacceptable state of affairs
is undisputed; the mainstream news media have noted that the “[f]ederal courts
are quietly allowing gun control—and [the Supreme Court] is letting them.”133
Consider what has been happening in the largest federal appellate court, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which includes the states
of California, Oregon, Washington, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Arizona,
and Alaska. The Ninth Circuit applies a double standard: one rule for
constitutional rights that it likes (such as abortion) and a different rule for rights
it disfavors (most prominently the Second Amendment).134 The Ninth Circuit
struck down an Arizona statute that “‘delayed’ women seeking an abortion.”135
“The court found it important there,” with respect to a statutory waiting period
for an abortion, “that the State ‘presented no evidence whatsoever that the law
furthers its interest’ and ‘no evidence that its alleged danger exists or has ever
occurred.’”136 Yet when it came to a statutory waiting period to purchase a
firearm, the Ninth Circuit did not care that the state of California presented no
evidence that such a period would make any difference in firearms violence; the
Ninth Circuit approved the waiting period “based solely on its own ‘common
sense.’”137 The Ninth Circuit also “struck down a county’s 5-day waiting period
for nude-dancing licenses because it ‘unreasonably prevented a dancer from

130. Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 576
U.S. 1013 (2015).
131. Silvester v. Becerra, 843 F.3d 816, 828–29 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 945
(2018).
132. Id. at 950 (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). See also Friedman v.
Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 447 (2015) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari); Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1996 (2017) (Thomas, J., joined by
Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
133. Alison Frankel, Federal Courts are Quietly Allowing Gun Control – and SCOTUS is
Letting
Them,
REUTERS
(June
13,
2016),
http://blogs.reuters.com/alisonfrankel/2016/06/13/federal-courts-are-quietly-allowing-gun-control-and-scotus-is-letting-them/;
see also Savage, supra note 98; Andrew C. McCarthy, Supreme Court Denies Review of ‘Assault
Weapon’
Ban,
NAT’L
REV.
(Dec.
7,
2015,
6:52
PM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/supreme-court-denies-review-assault-weapon-banandrew-c-mccarthy/.
134. Silvester, 138 S. Ct. at 951 (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“This
double standard is apparent from other cases where the Ninth Circuit applies heightened scrutiny.”).
135. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (quoting Planned Parenthood
Arizona, Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 917 (9th Cir. 2014)).
136. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (alterations in original) (quoting
Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc., 753 F.3d at 914–15).
137. Id. at 945 (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (quoting Silvester v. Harris,
843 F.3d 816, 828 (9th Cir. 2016)).
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exercising first amendment rights while an application was pending.’”138 “The
Ninth Circuit found it dispositive there,” where the (apparently) very important
constitutional right to dance naked on a bar for tips was at issue, that “the county
‘failed to demonstrate a need for the five-day delay period,’”139 yet no such
dearth of evidence troubled the Ninth Circuit when it upheld a gun-purchase
waiting period. As Justice Thomas explained in his dissent, “[i]n the Ninth
Circuit, it seems, rights that have no basis in the Constitution receive greater
protection than the Second Amendment, which is enumerated in the text.”140
The problem is not only the misapplication of Supreme Court precedent by
the lower federal courts; rather, the bigger problem is that the Supreme Court
for ten years refused to consider any Second Amendment challenge141 and
thereby allowed the individual’s right to keep and bear arms to be disregarded
by state and federal judges who disdain the Second Amendment.142 As Justice
Thomas explained when the Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal from a
Ninth Circuit decision upholding California’s ten-day waiting period on the
purchase of firearms in Silvester v. Becerra in 2016:
[The Supreme Court’s] continued refusal to hear Second
Amendment cases only enables this kind of defiance. . . . If this case
involved one of the Court’s more favored rights, I sincerely doubt we
would have denied certiorari. I suspect that four Members of this
Court would vote to review a 10-day waiting period for abortions,
notwithstanding a State’s purported interest in creating a ‘cooling off’
period. . . . I also suspect that four Members of this Court would vote
to review a 10-day waiting period on the publication of racist speech,
notwithstanding a State’s purported interest in giving the speaker time
to calm down. . . . Similarly, four Members of this Court would vote
to review even a 10-minute delay of a traffic stop . . . . The Court
would take these cases because abortion, speech, and the Fourth
Amendment are three of its favored rights. The right to keep and bear

138. Id. at 951 (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (alterations in original)
(quoting Kev, Inc. v. Kitsap Cnty., 793 F.2d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 1986)).
139. Id.
140. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
141. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and summarily reversed a Massachusetts state court
decision which had denied Second Amendment protection to stun guns. Caetano v. Massachusetts,
136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016).
142. See e.g. Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 469 (2017);
Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1995
(2017); Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
447 (2015); Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 2799 (2015); Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied,138 S. Ct.
945 (2018); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1100 (2014);
Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 952 (2013); Kachalsky
v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 918 (2013).
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arms is apparently this Court’s constitutional orphan. And the lower
courts seem to have gotten the message.143
Justices Thomas and Gorsuch filed a similar protest when the Supreme Court
refused to hear an appeal from a Ninth Circuit decision upholding California’s
statutory scheme allowing localities to deny virtually every application for a
concealed-carry permit:
The Court’s decision to deny certiorari in this case reflects a
distressing trend: the treatment of the Second Amendment as a
disfavored right. . . . The Constitution does not rank certain rights
above others, and [we] do not think this Court should impose such a
hierarchy by selectively enforcing its preferred rights.144
Speaking to the Federalist Society in 2020, Justice Alito stated that “the
ultimate second tier constitutional right in the minds of some is the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms. From 2010 when we decided
McDonald vs. Chicago until last term, the Supreme Court denied every single
petition asking us to review a lower court decision that rejected the Second
Amendment claim.”145 He went on to describe how, when the Court decided the
New York City case in 2020, it “said nothing about the Second Amendment.”146
Defenders of the Court’s reluctance to enforce the Second Amendment more
aggressively might suggest that the Court has appropriately held back to allow
lower courts a chance to develop the doctrine in this fraught area. But the lower
courts have by now had ample opportunity to weigh the various considerations
relevant to the scope of the Second Amendment, and the Supreme Court has had
ample time to determine the policy implications of the principal disputed issues.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should act now to protect all Americans that desire to
exercise their fundamental constitutional right to keep and bear arms from
hostile, local jurisdictions. Actual or potential gun owners who are seeking to
exercise their fundamental constitutional right to keep and bear arms in these
jurisdictions are entitled to the protections allotted under the preferred freedoms
doctrine set forth in Carolene Products Footnote Four.
The Supreme Court also should enforce gun rights against those few outlier
jurisdictions that seek to restrict the fundamental constitutional right to keep and
bear arms under the Second Amendment. In those few jurisdictions, gun owners

143. Silvester v. Harris, 138 S. Ct. 945, 951–52 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial
of certiorari) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
144. Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1999 (2017) (Thomas, J., joined by Gorsuch,
J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
145. Video and Transcript of Justice Alito’s Keynote Address to the Federalist Society,
REASON, (Nov. 12, 2020), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/11/12/video-and-transcript-of-justicealitos-keynote-address-to-the-federalist-society/.
146. Id.
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or those who wish to own guns who are deterred by onerous, likely
unconstitutional regulations are the sort of discrete and insular minority that the
Supreme Court indicated that it would protect in Carolene Products Footnote
Four.
By doing so, the Supreme Court would advance two jurisprudential concepts
it has long viewed as constitutionally appropriate. These include protecting
discrete and insular minorities from cultural oppression by an active local
majority—in this case a metropolitan majority—and striking down outlier laws
embraced by only a few jurisdictions that chose intentionally to ignore the U.S.
Constitution as written or be bound by Supreme Court precedent.

